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Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and
Tesar (1995) ﬁnd two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle mod-
els with complete markets and the data: In the models, cross-country correlations are much
higher for consumption than for output, while in the data the opposite is true; and cross-
country correlations of employment and investment are negative, while in the data they are
positive. This paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these
anomalies. The friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable; any country
can renege on its debts and suﬀer the consequences for future borrowing. To solve for equi-
librium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets, the methods of Marcet and
Marimon (1999) are extended. Incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more
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Minneapolis, MN 55480-0291Some quantitative properties of standard international business cycle models with complete
markets are at odds with the data. (See, for example, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992),
Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and Tesar (1995).) Primarily, the cross-country
correlations of consumption in standard models are much higher than those for output, while
in the data the opposite is true. And in these models, both employment and investment
in diﬀerent countries comove negatively, while in the data these variables comove positively.
Since these two discrepancies are robust to changes in both parameter values and the model
structure, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1993) call them anomalies. O n ep o s s i b l ee x p l a n a t i o n
for these anomalies, which has been stressed in the literature, is that standard models assume
perfectly functioning international credit markets, while actual credit markets may work far
from perfectly.
This paper introduces a friction into international credit markets to attempt to resolve
the quantitative anomalies of business cycle models. The friction is that international loans
are feasible only to the extent to which they can be enforced by the threat of exclusion from
future intertemporal and interstate trade. (Here, we follow the literature on international
debt, such as the studies of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Manuelli (1986) and those
surveyed by Eaton and Fernandez (1995) as well as the literature on debt-constrained asset
markets, particularly the work of Kehoe and Levine (1993, forthcoming), Kocherlakota (1996),
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Attanasio and Ríos-Rull
(2000).) This friction captures in a simple way the diﬃculties of enforcing contracts between
sovereign nations that involve large transfers of resources which are backed only by promises
to repay later. Throughout, we focus on the diﬃculties of enforcing contracts between agents
in diﬀerent sovereign nations when sovereign governments can abrogate contracts; we abstract
1completely from the diﬃculties of enforcing contracts between agents within a country.
We ﬁnd that including these enforcement diﬃculties in business cycle models does help
resolve the anomalies. Brieﬂy, we ﬁnd that compared to the properties of a complete markets
model, an economy with enforcement friction reduces the gap between the cross-country
correlation of consumption and that of output and makes employment and investment in the
two countries comove positively instead of negatively. The primary remaining conﬂict with
the data is another type of discrepancy: in the model the correlation between net exports
and output is positive instead of negative.
The model we study here is a standard international business cycle model modiﬁed
to incorporate the credit market friction. The model has two countries, and the business
cycle ﬂuctuations are driven by country-speciﬁc productivity shocks. We follow the debt-
constrained asset market literature and study a planning problem which includes, in addition
to resource constraints, enforcement constraints which require that in each period and state,
allocations can be enforced only if their value is greater than it would be if the country were
excluded from all further intertemporal and interstate trade. This constrained planning prob-
lem has an inﬁnite number of enforcement constraints with potentially complicated binding
patterns.
To solve the constrained planning problem, we extend the recursive contract approach
of Marcet and Marimon (1999). The key to this approach is to deﬁne as part of the state the
current relative weight of one of the two countries from the planning problem. This relative
weight is the original planning weight plus the sum of the history of all multipliers on the
enforcement constraints up to that period for one country relative to the analogous sum for
the other country. When the state of the world economy is enlarged to include this relative
2weight, the solution can be summarized by stationary decision rules.
The allocations from this constrained planning problem can be interpreted in at least
two ways. Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) interpret them as
competitive equilibria in which the enforcement constraints are part of the private agent
budget sets. We prefer to interpret the allocations as do Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993),
Kocherlakota (1996) and authors of some related work in the international debt literature:
as equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game. In this game, private agents solve standard
competitive equilibrium problems, while the government of each country can choose to prevent
its citizens from repaying their outstanding international debts and instead tax the income
from capital. In a separate appendix (available upon request), we show that the allocations
that solve the constrained planning problem can be supported as equilibria of this game only
if they satisfy these enforcement constraints.
The theoretical implications of limited enforcement constraints have been studied be-
fore, but mostly in a pure exchange, closed economy setting. The papers by Kehoe and
Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) study such constraints
for simple pure exchange, closed economies, with the ﬁrst two papers concentrating on quan-
tity eﬀects and the third on price eﬀects. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (1997, 2000) use simple
quantitative economies to study insurance arrangements in villages in India, while Alvarez
and Jermann (1998) study the quantitative implications of enforcement constraints for asset
prices. Other applications include the work of Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), who show that
adding compulsory insurance in an economy with enforcement problems can interfere with
the functioning of private markets. All of these papers study pure exchange economies except
for that of Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000), which allows for storage. Our paper extends
3this analysis to a full-blown international business cycle model with standard neoclassical
production functions and plausible parameter values.
A few papers–for example, those of Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kollmann (1996)
and Heathcote and Perri (2000)–have investigated the quantitative impact of friction in
international ﬁnancial markets on the properties of international business cycles. (For some
theoretical work, see the studies by Cole (1988) and Cole and Obstfeld (1991).) However, the
friction in these papers is an exogenous limit on the type of assets that may be traded–only
uncontingent bonds or none at all. Rather than exogenously limit the type of assets, our
approach limits the amount of contingent claims of a particular type that can be sold–to
the amount the debtor is willing to repay as captured by the enforcement constraints.
For comparison, though, we also describe and solve a model in which trade in contin-
gent assets is restricted exogenously. We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the endogenous enforcement
constraints are quantitatively quite diﬀerent from the eﬀects of the exogenous asset market
restrictions. For example, recall that in the data, both employment and investment comove
positively across countries, and those data have generally been diﬃcult to reproduce. Baxter
(1995, p. 43) has written in her recent survey of international business cycles, that
It has proved particularly diﬃcult to write down plausibly-parameterized models
which can generate positive comovement of labor and investment across countries.
. . . Thus a major challenge to the theory is to develop a model which can explain
international comovement in labor input and investment.
In our study, both the complete markets model and the exogenous incomplete markets model
fail to meet that challenge. But our model with endogenous incomplete markets generates
4strong positive comovements for both employment and investment.
1. THE ECONOMIES
We consider three variants of the standard two-country business cycle economy of Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992). To establish a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the standard com-
plete markets setup. Then we incorporate endogenous market incompleteness arising from
limited enforcement constraints. And ﬁnally, we incorporate exogenous market incomplete-
ness, as do Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996), by restricting trade in assets to
simple uncontingent bonds. We do so to highlight the diﬀerences between our model with
enforcement constraints and the literature’s models.
1.1. A complete markets economy
Our theoretical world economy consists of two countries, i =1 ,2, each represented by a large
number of identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers and a production technology. The countries
produce the same good, and their preferences and technologies have the same structure and
parameter values. Although the technologies have the same form, they diﬀer in two respects:
in each country, the labor input consists only of domestic labor, and production is subject to
country-speciﬁc technology shocks.
In each period t, the world economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many events st. We
denote by st =( s0,...,s t) the history of events up through and including period t.T h e
probability, as of period 0, of any particular history st is π(st). The initial realization s0 is
given, so that π(s0)=1 . In each period t, t h es i n g l eg o o di sp r o d u c e di nc o u n t r yi using
inputs of capital ki(st−1) and domestic labor li(st). Production is also subject to a country-






where F is a standard constant returns to scale production function. Consumers in country










where ci(st) denotes consumption by consumers in country i at st and β denotes the discount



















where δ is the per period depreciation rate of capital.
The complete markets version of this economy is deﬁned in the standard way. The allo-

























subject to the resource constraints (3). In our computations, we set the weights λ1 = λ2.
Given the symmetry of shocks, utility functions and production technologies we impose, the
planning problem with these weights gives the same allocations that arise in a competitive
equilibrium in which consumers in country i own the initial capital in country i and all the
6labor income in country i and have no initial debts.
1.2. An economy with enforcement constraints
Consider next an economy with enforcement constraints. Here we lay out the economy and
show how to cast the problem of ﬁnding optimal allocations as a recursive programming
problem.
This economy has, besides the resource constraints, enforcement constraints which
require that at every point in time, each country prefers the allocation it receives relative to
the allocation it could attain if it were in autarky, or self-suﬃcient, from then onward. These













where π(sr|st) denotes the conditional probability of sr given st, π(st|st)=1 , and
Vi(ki(st−1),s t) denotes the value of autarky from st onward, which is given by the value




















r)) + (1 − δ)ki(s
r−1)
with ki(st−1) given.
Consider the problem of maximizing a weighted sum of utilities subject to the resource
7constraints and the enforcement constraints; namely, choose allocations {ci(st),l i(st),k i(st)}
























subject to (3) for all st, and (5) for i =1 ,2 and all st, where λ1 and λ2 are nonnegative initial
weights.
One way to approach this problem is to make the shocks Markovian and then recast
the problem as a standard dynamic programming problem with a state that consists of the
current capital stocks and the current shocks. Unfortunately, in that formulation, future
decision variables, like consumption and leisure, enter the current enforcement constraint.
This feature makes the standard dynamic programming approach inapplicable. In an early
contribution, Kydland and Prescott (1980) study an optimal tax problem with this feature
and show that if the state space is expanded to include an extra (pseudo) state variable,
then the problem has a solution that is stationary in the expanded state space. Marcet and
Marimon (1999) extend this approach to a variety of contexts. In our context, the additional
state variable turns out to be the ratio of the sums of the multipliers on the enforcement
constraints. When we make the shocks Markovian and add this new state variable to the
standard ones, namely, the capital stocks and the shocks, we have a recursive problem.
We develop our approach as follows. Letting β
tπ(st)µi(st) denote the multipliers on
the enforcement constraints, we can write the Lagrangian as (6) plus the sum of terms relating


















for all t and st, plus standard terms relating to the resource constraints. Since π(sr)=



























for t ≥ 0, and Mi(s−1) equals λi. Notice that the Mi(st) are simply the original planning
weights λi plus the sum of the past multipliers on the enforcement constraints along the





























for i =1 ,2 for all st, together with the complementary slackness conditions. In these ﬁrst-
order conditions, we have used the abbreviation Uic(st) for ∂U(ci(st),l i(st))/∂ci, and we have
9used similar abbreviations for other terms. For convenience, we normalize these multipliers
by deﬁning vi(st)=µi(st)/Mi(st) and z(st)=M2(st)/M1(st). This allows us to keep track
of only the relative weight z(st) in the state instead of the two absolute weights Mi(st).T h e
transition law for Mi(st) can be written as [1 − vi(st)]Mi(st)=Mi(st−1), so the transition







We will refer to z(st) as the relative weight on country 2 consumers. With these normalized


























in place of (10) together with the transition law (11) and the complementary slackness con-
ditions with the normalized multipliers.
We will focus on economies in which the underlying shocks are Markov, so that the
conditional probability π(st|st−1) c a nb ew r i t t e na sπ(st|st−1). In such economies, the solution
to the programming problem in (6) can be characterized recursively by policy rules for the
allocations of the form ci(xt),l i(xt),k i(xt) together with policy rules for the relative weight
z(xt) and the multipliers vi(xt), w h e r et h es t a t ei sxt =( z(st−1),k 1(st−1),k 2(st−1),s t). These
10policy functions satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (9), (12) and (13) and the transition law
(11) together with the resource constraints (3), the enforcement constraints (5) and the
complementary slackness conditions on the multipliers.
In a separate appendix, we give one interpretation of how this economy can be decen-
tralized. In the decentralization, the government of each country can tax payments made to
foreigners and capital income and then rebate the proceeds to its citizens as a lump sum. Ex-
cept for these government policies, private markets function perfectly in this economy. This
set of policies turns out to be suﬃcient for the decentralization of the optimal plan as the out-
come of a dynamic game. In this economy, the governments in the two countries sequentially
choose policy in an optimal fashion to maximize the welfare of their residents. We set up and
deﬁne a sustainable equilibrium for this economy along the lines of that considered by Chari
and Kehoe (1990, 1993), who have extended the work of Abreu (1988) to economies with
competitive private agents. We show that the allocations that satisfy the programming prob-
lem (6) are sustainable allocations. The right side of the enforcement constraints corresponds
to the value of the worst sustainable equilibrium.
1.3. A bond economy
Consider next an economy in which the menu of assets that are traded internationally is
exogenously restricted to a single uncontingent bond. The remaining primitives are the same
as in the economy just described.
In this economy, the representative agents in the two countries maximize their expected















where wi(st) and ri(st) are the wage and the rental rate on capital in country i, q(st) is the
period t price of the uncontingent bond that pays one unit of the consumption good in period
t+1regardless of the state of the world and bi(st) denotes the quantity of uncontingent bonds
purchased at t by a consumer in country i. We also bound the borrowing of agents by the
condition b(st) ≥− ¯ b, where ¯ b is some large positive number.
In the two countries, ﬁrms solve the standard static proﬁt-maximization problem, and
bond market-clearing requires that b1(st)+b2(st)=0 . An equilibrium for this economy is
deﬁned in the standard way.
2. PARAMETER VALUES AND COMPUTATION
Now we brieﬂy describe the procedures we use to select benchmark parameter values, listed
in Table 1, and to compute a solution to the programming problem.
The speciﬁcation of preferences and technology is standard and follows Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992). The utility function is U(c,l)=[ cγ(1 − l)1−γ]1−σ/(1 − σ),a n dt h e
production function is F(k,Al)=kα(Al)1−α. (See Table 1 for details.)
In terms of the productivity shocks, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Baxter and
Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996) assume that the technology shocks in the two countries

































The innovations εt =( ε1t,ε2t) are serially independent, multivariate normal random variables
with contemporaneous covariance matrix V , which allows for contemporaneous correlation
between innovations in the home country and the foreign country. Thus, the shocks are
stochastically related through the oﬀ-diagonal element a2, called the spillover parameter, and
the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix V.
Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996) use the production function and
estimates of the inputs to form time series on Ait for the United States and for some European
countries. These researchers ﬁnd little evidence of spillover, in that a2 is close to zero, and
some evidence for substantial persistence, with a1 large. Kollmann (1996) focuses on a1 = .95
while Baxter and Crucini report results for a range of parameters for a1 around .95. We follow
these studies and as a baseline set a1 = .95 and a2 =0 . In our sensitivity analyses, we explore
several variations around this baseline, both with higher persistence, by setting a1 = .99
and a2 =0(termed high persistence), and with nonzero spillover, by setting a1 = .85 and
a2 = .15 (termed high spillover), as well as with the original estimates of Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992) (termed BKK), with a1 = .906 and a2 = .088. In terms of the covariance
matrix, we set var ε1 = var ε2 = .0072 and corr(ε1,ε2)=.25, which are in line with the
estimates of these three studies.
Our computational procedure makes it convenient to use a discrete state Markov
13chain to represent the stochastic technology shocks. We let total factor productivity in
both countries take on three values. We choose the values of the states and the transition
probabilities by simulating the VAR 50 million times and then estimating the Markov chain
on the simulated data by maximum likelihood.
The computational procedure we use to ﬁnd the optimal allocations in the economy
with enforcement constraints is a version of the policy function iteration algorithm, modiﬁed
to handle enforcement constraints. (For comparison purposes, we compute the equilibria for
all three economies using the same method.)
Let x =( z,k1,k 2,s) be the state of the economy. Our procedure ﬁnds policy functions
for current consumption and labor ci(x),l i(x), for future capital and relative weight k0
i(x),z0(x)
and for multipliers vi(x). For convenience, we also deﬁne value functions Wi(x) that satisfy






All of these functions need to satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (9), (12) and (13) and the
transition law (11) together with the resource constraints (3), the enforcement constraints
(5) and the complementary slackness conditions on the multipliers. In practice, we deﬁne
ag r i dX on the state space and restrict our search within the class of functions that take
arbitrary values for every x ∈ X and are equal to the piecewise bilinear interpolation of those
values for every x/ ∈ X. These functions are completely characterized over the entire state
space by specifying their value for every x ∈ X.
We start with a guess for the solution to the planning problem (6) without enforcement






14for every x ∈ X. Given the ﬁrst-order conditions and the initial guess, we ﬁnd a new set of






follows. Since we do not know in advance the binding pattern of the enforcement constraints,
we consider separately the three possible binding patterns: neither constraint binds, that of
the home country binds but that of the foreign country is slack and that of the foreign country
binds but that of the home country is slack. (Clearly, both cannot bind simultaneously.) First,
for each x ∈ X, we compute allocations assuming that neither enforcement constraint binds









0) ≥ Vi(ki,s) (15)
for i =1 ,2. If these allocations satisfy both constraints, then we deﬁne them to be the
new set of allocations for this x, we set the new multipliers v1
i(x)=0and we deﬁne the
value function W 1
i (x) by the left side of (15). If, say, the constructed allocations satisfy the
enforcement constraint for country 1 but not that for country 2, then we set the multiplier on
country 1’s constraint to zero, v1
1(x)=0 , and we write the enforcement constraint of country










We deﬁne the new value functions by the left side of (15) for country 1 and the left side of
(16) for country 2.
If the allocations constructed under the assumption that neither enforcement con-
straint binds satisfy the enforcement constraint for country 2 but not that for country 1,
15then we set the multiplier on country 2’s constraint to zero, v1
2(x)=0 , and proceed anal-











i(x)).I f , o n e a c h g r i d p o i n t ,
these vectors are equal up to a small positive number, we stop; otherwise, we set the initial
guess equal to the new set of policy, multiplier and value functions. We keep iterating until
the value functions and policy functions converge. (See Kehoe and Perri (2000) for details.)
3. FINDINGS
Now we compare the quantitative properties of our theoretical world economies with those of
the data. In general, we ﬁnd that endogenous enforcement constraints go a long way toward
resolving the anomalies while the exogenous asset market restrictions do not.
In Tables 2—3, the statistics reported in the ﬁrst nine rows in the data column are
from U.S. quarterly time series. The international correlations in the tables’ remaining rows
of that column refer to the correlations between U.S. variables and the same variables for an
aggregate of 15 European countries. For all the statistics, the time period is from the ﬁrst
quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 1998. For more details on the data sources, see the
following appendix. The numbers in parentheses below the U.S. statistics are the Newey-
West standard errors that were generated by posing the estimation of the data moments as
a generalized-method-of moments problem.
3.1. Three basic economies
We start with a comparison of the complete markets economy and the data. In Table 2,
we see three major discrepancies for this economy. Two of them are the two discrepancies
labeled anomalies by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1993): Consumption’s correlation across
16countries is substantially higher than output’s in the model (.28 vs. −.46), while in the
data the reverse is true (.32 vs. .51). And the cross-country correlations of investment and
employment are negative in the model (−.99 and −.58, respectively), while in the data these
correlations are positive (.29 and .43, respectively). The third discrepancy is another well-
known diﬀerence between standard business cycle models and the data: Both net exports
and investment are much more volatile in the model than in the data, with net exports being
more than 85 times as volatile as the data (13.04 vs. .15) and investment being about 8 times
as volatile (25.23 vs. 3.24).
Consider next the economy in which asset trade is restricted to uncontingent bonds
(referred to as the bond economy in the tables). In this economy, the three discrepancies
remain substantially unchanged. Output is still less correlated across countries than is con-
sumption, but the discrepancy with the data is somewhat smaller than that in the complete
markets economy. The negative cross correlation of investment is the same as that with
complete markets, and the cross correlation of employment is only slightly higher. And net
exports and investment are still much more volatile in the model than in the data.
Consider now the economy with enforcement constraints (referred to as the enforce-
ment economy in the tables). In terms of the cross-country correlations, note that adding
enforcement constraints has made consumption’s much closer to output’s, although consump-
tion’s is still slightly bigger (.29 vs. .25). Also, relative to the complete markets and bond
economies, the enforcement constraint has changed the cross correlations of investment and
employment from negative to positive. And ﬁnally, introducing enforcement constraints dras-
tically reduces the volatility of net exports and investment relative to their volatility in the
complete markets economy. Now the volatility of net exports is actually smaller in the model
17than in the data (.06 vs. .15) and the volatility of investment is about right (3.04 vs. 3.24).
In these dimensions, the enforcement economy has gone a long way toward reducing the dis-
crepancies between the theory and the data. The main remaining discrepancy between the
enforcement economy and the data is that the variable net exports is procyclical in the model
but countercyclical in the data. (Its correlation with GDP is .27 in the model, but −.36 in
the data.)
3.2. Adding adjustment costs
Again, it is well known that the volatilities of investment and net exports are much higher
in standard one-good international business cycle models than in the data. In these models,
capital ﬂows rapidly to the country with the higher productivity shock. Usually in such
models, these volatilities are reduced by adding to the model costs to change capital, or
adjustment costs. But incorporating enforcement problems in a model naturally introduces
forces inhibiting the ﬂow of capital to more productive countries. In this sense, once a
model has enforcement problems, it does not need tacked on adjustment costs to smooth out
investment and net exports.
Nevertheless, the current literature has adjustment costs. So we wonder, how does
the enforcement economy (with its natural forces inhibiting capital ﬂows) compare to the
complete markets economy and the bond economy with adjustment costs added on? With































Here, φ is the parameter that determines the magnitude of capital adjustment costs.
In the last two columns of Table 2, we report the statistics for the complete markets
economy and the bond economy with adjustment costs, with φ chosen for each model so that
the volatility of investment relative to the volatility of GDP is similar to that in the data.
Clearly, in both models, the adjustment costs inhibit ﬂows of investment goods so that the
volatility of net exports is also more in line with the data (.36 and .33 vs. .15). In terms
of the cross-country correlations, the anomalies still remain, although they are somewhat
diminished. In both the complete markets and bond economies with adjustment costs, the
cross-country correlation of consumption is still higher than that of output, and this anomaly
is more pronounced in the complete markets economy (.77 vs. .09) and in the bond economy
(.62 vs. .12) than in the economy with enforcement constraints (.29 vs. .25).I n b o t h t h e
complete markets and the bond economies, the adjustment costs increase the cross correlation
for investment compared to the corresponding economies without adjustment costs, but in
both economies, that correlation remains negative (−.17 and −.09). The adjustment costs
have a similar eﬀect on the cross correlation of employment.
3.3. Responses to a productivity shock
We can get some intuition for why the economies have these properties by examining the
impulse responses of variables in the economies to a positive productivity shock to country
1. We refer to country 1 as the home country and country 2 as the foreign country. We focus
19on just the last three of the ﬁve economies we have examined: the enforcement economy, the
complete markets economy with adjustment costs and the bond economy with adjustment
costs. We suppose that in all three economies, both countries have had their productivity
equal to the average (mean) level for a long time, and then in period 0, the home country
switches to high productivity while the foreign country does not. Starting with this con-
ﬁguration of shocks along with the associated capital stocks and the relative weight z =1
in period 0, we use simulations to calculate the conditional expectation of each variable in
period t for t =0 ,1,....
In Figures 1—7, we plot for the three economies the percentage changes in the variables
due to the productivity increase in the home country. In Figure 1 we see that on impact, the
productivity in that country increases by about 1.5% a n dt h e ns l o w l yd e c r e a s e st oi t sm e a n .
The productivity in the foreign country, meanwhile, does not change because there are no
spillovers (a2 =0 ) .
In Figures 2a and b we plot the responses for output in both countries for the three
economies. In the home country in all three, we see that the positive productivity shock of
about 1.5% leads to a substantial increase in output, of about 2.4% on impact. In the foreign
country, in contrast, output initially drops a bit in the complete markets and bond economies,
then becomes slightly positive after several years, while in the enforcement economy output
is positive after a quarter.
In Figures 3a and b we see that in the complete markets economy, risk-sharing leads
foreign consumption to rise along with home consumption after a positive productivity shock
in the home country. In the bond economy, risk-sharing is somewhat inhibited, so that foreign
consumption rises by less in that economy than under complete markets. In the enforcement
20economy, risk-sharing is greatly inhibited; consumption in the foreign country is essentially
constant. This inhibition of risk-sharing is what lies behind the cross-country correlations for
consumption discussed above.
In Figures 4 and 5 we see that in all three economies, the home country productivity
shock leads to a rise in home country inputs (investment and employment), with the smallest
initial rise in the enforcement economy. In the foreign country, at the same time, inputs
have diﬀerent patterns across the economies. In Figures 4b and 5b we see that in the foreign
country in the complete markets and bond economies, both investment and employment drop
initially, while in the enforcement economy, investment rises only slightly and employment
remains essentially unchanged.
In Figure 6 we see that in the complete markets and bond economies, the shock leads
to a home country trade deﬁcit (negative net exports), while in the enforcement economy it
leads to a home country trade surplus.
Finally, in Figure 7 we plot the impulse response for the ratio of the marginal utility
of consumption in the foreign country to that in the home country. This ratio summarizes
the extent of risk-sharing in the three economies. In the complete markets economy, risk-
sharing is perfect, and the productivity shock does not change the ratio of marginal utilities
between the two countries. Both the bond and enforcement economies, however, experience
persistent deviations from perfect risk-sharing, so that the ratio of marginal utilities is no
longer equalized. The deviations are much more severe in the enforcement economy than in
the bond economy in the sense that the ratio of marginal utility is everywhere higher in the
enforcement economy.
To understand the economics behind these responses, consider ﬁrst the complete mar-
21kets model. The positive productivity shock in the home country naturally increases the
productivity of capital and labor, so shifting resources to this country is optimal. Thus, the
capital stock in that country increases, both by domestic residents saving more and by more
investment ﬂowing in from abroad. The net inﬂow of investment leads to a trade deﬁcit in
the home country. In the foreign country, meanwhile, investment initially falls. With regard
to labor, the temporarily high productivity of labor in the home country makes it optimal to
increase labor eﬀort at home and decrease it abroad. Because of risk-sharing, the increased
output in the home country also leads to increased consumption in the foreign country. Since
consumption and labor are complements in utility, consumption increases substantially more
at home than abroad. Overall, the shifting of resources from the foreign country to the home
country helps explain the small or negative correlations between inputs and between outputs.
In the bond economy, the responses generally move in the same direction as those in
the complete markets economy. However, the restrictions on asset trade make risk-sharing
more diﬃcult in the bond economy, so all of the responses are somewhat dampened.
In the enforcement economy, the need to satisfy the enforcement constraints leads to
much more severe restrictions on risk-sharing and investment ﬂows. Consider the restrictions
on the shifting of resources. Suppose, for intuition’s sake, that a planner ignores the enforce-
ment constraints and tries to implement the complete markets allocations. For the country
with the positive shock, the home country, the high and persistent increase in productivity
increases the value of autarky, making default an attractive option. Moreover, if the planner
starts shifting capital to this country, the value of autarky rises even higher, making default
an even better option. Since this allocation violates the enforcement constraints, the planner
restricts the investment ﬂows to the home country in order to keep down the value of autarky.
22(This is the interpretation of the last term on the right side of (13).) Moreover, the planner
actually builds up the capital stock in the foreign country in order to increase the value to the
home country of sticking to the implicit risk-sharing agreement. These patterns of investment
lead the home country to run a trade surplus instead of a deﬁcit.
Consider next the eﬀects of the enforcement constraints on consumption. Under com-
plete markets, risk-sharing dictates that consumers in the home country, with the positive
shock, should share much of their gains with those in the foreign country, without the shock.
If the planner is to meet the enforcement constraints, this large risk-sharing is not feasible.
To meet the enforcement constraints, then, the planner must increase the discounted value
of utility of the home country by increasing its relative weight. This leads to higher present
consumption as well as higher future consumption in that country (through a persistent
movement in z). The movement in the relative weight implies that the planner increases the
ratio of foreign marginal utility to home marginal utility in a way that persists over time. As
the productivity shock starts to decay, the value of autarky decreases, and the planner then
lowers the relative weight of the home country.
3.4. Sensitivity analyses
In Table 3 we report the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the structure of
technology shocks in the enforcement economy and the bond economy with adjustment costs.
We experiment with the alternative shock processes described above.
In the high persistence experiment (in which we increase a1 from .95 to .99), there is
little change from the baseline in either the enforcement or the bond economy. In the bond
economy, the increased persistence lowers the gap a bit between the consumption and output
23cross-country correlations, but it does so at the expense of making inputs more negatively
correlated.
In both economies, increasing the spillover in the high spillover experiment (by in-
creasing a2 from 0 to .15) increases the gap between the consumption and output cross-
country correlations. Partly this is because, even without trade between countries, a shock
to the home country signals foreign consumers that their output will increase in the future.
This leads foreign consumers to increase their consumption in anticipation of this spillover.
The BKK experiment (in which a1 is decreased to .906 and a2 is increased to .088)
has a similar eﬀect on the consumption and output correlations as does the high spillover
experiment. In addition, the BKK experiment leads to lower cross-country correlations of
inputs in both economies.
We also conducted sensitivity analyses for other parameters in the model, including
the discount factor β, the curvature parameter σ, and the capital share parameter α which
are available upon request. Overall, little changes.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated a new direction for the quantitative equilibrium approach to interna-
tional business cycles. We have found that limited enforcement of contracts in international
credit markets goes a long way toward resolving some of the anomalies in the literature.
We have found that the allocations that can be enforced by threat of exclusion from fu-
ture intertemporal and interstate trade are quite diﬀerent from those under complete markets.
Our approach and our results are diﬀerent from those of other researchers who have investi-
gated the importance of incomplete markets in international business cycle models (Baxter
24and Crucini (1995)). Other researchers have found that if the assets that are tradeable in-
ternationally are restricted exogenously to a single uncontingent bond, then the equilibrium
allocations are, for the most part, similar to those arising under complete markets. In con-
trast, we have found that introducing enforcement constraints drives the economy far away
from the complete markets allocation regardless of the parameters of the model.
Quantitatively, we have found that a model with enforcement constraints makes two
major contributions. It reproduces the data’s positive cross-country comovements of factors
of production. And it comes closer than existing models to reproducing the data’s patterns
of cross-country comovements of consumption and output.
The main failing of the model with enforcement constraints is that its constraints
reduce the international ﬂow of investment so much that they actually produce the wrong
sign in the relation between net exports and output: the model predicts a positive comovement
between net exports and output while the data have the opposite. One potential explanation
for this failing is that the model’s penalties for exclusion from asset trade are not severe
enough. One can imagine other ways that countries interact besides this type of trade, such
as spot trade of goods, international defence treaties and so on. For countries that have more
intertwined relationships, the potential losses by being excluded from these relationships
are more severe, and perhaps greater international ﬂows of investment would exist. The
diﬃcult problem is to design a model with imperfections that tend to inhibit the sharing of
consumption risk relatively more while at the same time inhibiting the ﬂows of investment
relatively less than in the current setup.
25APPENDIX
We collected data series for output, consumption, investment and employment for the United
States and an aggregate of 15 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The data we used cover the period from the ﬁrst quarter
of 1970 through the fourth quarter of 1998.
The U.S. series are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis economic database
(known as FRED), and the particular series used are gross domestic product, personal con-
sumption expenditures, ﬁxed private investment (all real) and civilian employment.
The series for the aggregate of 15 European countries are from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development publication, Main Economic Indicators (Aggregate
EU15), and they are gross domestic product, private ﬁnal consumption expenditure, gross
ﬁxed capital formation (all real) and civilian employment.
We also collected exports and imports (nominal) of the United States toward the 15
European countries by aggregating the U.S. imports and the imports by country reported in
the International Monetary Fund publication, Directions of Trade Statistics.T h es t a t i s t i c s
relative to net exports refer to U.S. exports toward EU15 minus U.S. imports from EU15 all
divided by U.S. GDP (nominal).
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30TABLE 1.  Parameter values
Experiments Parameters
Baseline Experiments
Preferences β  = .99,   σ  = 2,   γ  = .36
Technology α  = .36,   δ  = .025
Productivity shocks a1 = .95, a2 = 0
var(ε 1) = var(ε 2) = .007
2, corr(ε 1, ε 2) = .25
Sensitivity Experiments
Adjustment costs* φ  = .6
High persistence a1 = .99, a2 = 0
High spillover a1 = .85, a2 = .15
BKK a1 = .906, a2 = .088
*In the other sensitivity analysis experiments, the adjustment cost parameter in the bond economy is set to match the relative volatility of investment in
   the data.TABLE 2.  Business cycle statistics:  Baseline parameters
Economy with
No Adjustment Costs Adjustment Costs





2.01 1.94 1.33 1.37 1.34
Net Exports/GDP 0.15
(.01)
13.04 12.42 0.06 0.36 0.33
% Standard deviations relative to GDP
Consumption 0.79
(.05)
0.19 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.29
Investment 3.24
(.17)
25.23 25.06 3.04 3.42 3.24
Employment 0.63
(.04)





0.90 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.94
Investment 0.93
(.02)
0.07 0.08 0.99 0.95 0.95
Employment 0.86
(.03)
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Net Exports/GDP − 0.36
(.09)
0.06 0.06 0.27 − 0.02 − 0.05
International Correlations
Home and Foreign GDP 0.51
(.13)
− 0.46 − 0.43 0.25 0.09 0.12
Home and Foreign Consumption 0.32
(.17)
0.28 0.13 0.29 0.77 0.62
Home and Foreign Investment 0.29
(.17)
− 0.99 − 0.99 0.33 − 0.17 − 0.09
Home and Foreign Employment 0.43
(.11)
− 0.58 − 0.53 0.23 − 0.15 − 0.04
Note:  The statistics in the first 9 rows of the data column are calculated from U.S. quarterly time series, 1970:1–1998:4.  The statistics in the last 4 rows of the data column are calculated from U.S. variables and an
aggregate of 15 European countries.  The data statistics are GMM estimates of the moments based on logged (except for net exports) and Hodrick-Prescott–filtered data with a smoothing parameter of 1,600.  The
numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  The model statistics are computed from a simulation of 100,000 periods, where the relevant series have been logged and HP-filtered as the data series.
Source:  See Appendix.TABLE 3.  Business cycle statistics:  Sensitivity to technology shocks














1.33 1.26 1.27 1.20 1.34 1.36 1.30 1.23
Net Exports/GDP 0.15
(.01)
0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.34
% Standard deviations relative to GDP
Consumption 0.79
(.05)
0.28 0.38 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.35
Investment 3.24
(.17)
3.04 2.76 3.08 2.78 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24
Employment 0.63
(.04)





0.93 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.89
Investment 0.93
(.02)
0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.93
Employment 0.86
(.03)
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97
Net Exports/GDP − 0.36
(.09)
0.27 0.25 0.42 0.52 − 0.05 − 0.34 0.07 0.02
International Correlations
Home and Foreign GDP 0.51
(.13)
0.25 0.25 0.32 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.25 0.14
Home and Foreign Consumption 0.32
(.17)
0.29 0.28 0.62 0.76 0.62 0.52 0.77 0.85
Home and Foreign Investment 0.29
(.17)
0.33 0.33 0.35 0.08 − 0.09 − 0.51 0.08 − 0.30
Home and Foreign Employment 0.43
(.11)
0.23 0.22 0.21 − 0.16 − 0.04 − 0.14 0.07 − 0.30
Note:  The statistics in the first 9 rows of the data column are calculated from U.S. quarterly time series, 1970:1–1998:4.  The statistics in the last 4 rows of the data column are calculated from U.S.
variables and an aggregate of 15 European countries.  The data statistics are GMM estimates of the moments based on logged (except for net exports) and Hodrick-Prescott–filtered data with a
smoothing parameter of 1,600.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  The model statistics are computed from a simulation of 100,000 periods, where the relevant series have been logged
and HP-filtered as the data series.
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